Tkatchenko's Taiwan gamble puts PNG's gas revenue on the line

by PAUL L. KEBAIJA

Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko has made a habit of unilateral gestures dressed up as policy. His latest may be his costliest. On 16 July, Tkatchenko abruptly announced the closure of Taiwan's representative office in Port Moresby without prior negotiation with Taipei, ending an economic presence established in 1990 following a trade agreement signed the previous year. The consequences arrived within days.

Taiwan's Foreign Ministry has convened a meeting to weigh responses, including a review of its liquefied natural gas purchases from PNG. Taiwan buys roughly 1.2 million tonnes of LNG annually about a third of PNG's LNG exports and a major source of national revenue. Consider what is now in play: LNG accounts for more than 40 percent of PNG's total exports. No responsible foreign minister puts a third of the country's flagship export market under review to score a symbolic point. Yet that is precisely what has happened.

The process was as troubling as the substance. Taiwanese officials said they were blindsided, and Taipei has lodged a protest, rejected the decision as unilateral, and pledged to keep the office operating as normal an extraordinary standoff for a government office in a friendly capital. More damning still, a Taiwanese official familiar with the matter said the decision was driven primarily by Tkatchenko himself and did not necessarily reflect consensus within the PNG government, with some officials still supporting cooperation with Taiwan. If accurate, PNG's foreign policy is being made by one man's instincts rather than cabinet deliberation.

The timing compounds the incoherence. The announcement came just a week after PNG's own government voiced concern over China's testing of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile in the South Pacific. Port Moresby protested Beijing's militarisation of Pacific waters one week, then handed Beijing a diplomatic trophy the next. Unsurprisingly, China's foreign ministry said it "highly commends" the closure, while the US State Department declared itself "deeply concerned" and characterised the move as part of Beijing's intimidation campaign. PNG has managed to alarm its security partners and delight the power whose missile tests it just condemned.

What does PNG actually lose? Beyond LNG revenue at risk, Taiwan's technical missions in PNG, focused on agriculture and fisheries, have created jobs and contributed to economic development, practical benefits for ordinary Papua New Guineans, traded away for applause from Beijing. This also follows form: in 2023, Tkatchenko shut PNG's own trade office in Taipei, insisting the move owed nothing to Chinese pressure. Two closures, one direction of travel.

There was no need to choose. PNG has recognised Beijing since 1976 while maintaining pragmatic trade ties with Taiwan for over three decades,the standard arrangement most one-China states manage without incident. Tkatchenko has collapsed that careful balance for no articulated economic gain, no consultation, and no evident cabinet mandate. If Taiwan's LNG review turns into cancelled purchases, the bill for this gesture will be paid not by the minister, but by a country that can least afford it.